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This paper expands the organization theory and evidence on regional industrial agglomerations. We define regionaleconomic activities according to the attributes of the organizations that populate a region and investigate how organiza-
tional characteristics influence macro-outcomes at a regional economic level. We focus on two dimensions emerging from
two widely known organizational forms: the managerial corporation and the knowledge cluster with a marked orientation
toward interfirm knowledge spillovers. We use an original data set of 146 U.S. cities to obtain variations in the extent
to which they are populated by managerial firms or knowledge clusters. By utilizing city-level measures of managerial
salaries, we test how the intensity of managerial corporation versus knowledge cluster characteristics affects the mean and
dispersion of the “rewards” of cities. Our evidence suggests that higher managerial corporate characteristics lower the vari-
ability of rewards, while they have no effect on the mean of rewards. Higher-knowledge cluster characteristics produce both
higher dispersion and higher expected rewards. We explain these results by looking at the different learning mechanisms
of the two organizational types. In so doing, we highlight the role of intra- and interfirm knowledge processes as important
sources of differences in the rewards of the two models. From an empirical point of view, results are confirmed using both
patent-based and skill mobility–based measures of knowledge spillovers.
Key words : regional cluster; organizational attributes; knowledge spillovers; managerial salaries
History : Published online in Articles in Advance July 28, 2009.
1. Introduction
The nature of the industrial agglomeration processes
and their impact on the economic characteristics of the
locations in which they take place are critical dimen-
sions of the organization of industries and the competi-
tive advantages of regions (Porter 1998, Saxenian 1994).
The literature analyzes industrial agglomerations from
the perspectives of social networks (Sorenson 2003), the
presence of spontaneous inputs (Chiles et al. 2004), the
effects of agglomeration economies (Krugman 1991),
or the factors that shape industrial agglomeration as a
long-term regional phenomenon, like the work on the
identity of clusters by Romanelli and Khessina (2005).
The empirical evidence is less extensive. It examines the
advantages or disadvantages of firms to locate in a par-
ticular region (Kalnins and Chung 2004) or the origin of
the externalities in the regional social network (Almeida
and Kogut 1999).
Against this background, this paper studies how dif-
ferences in the organizational attributes of the firms
that form an industrial agglomeration generate different
regional economic outcomes. We focus on the interre-
lationships between the distribution of regional rewards
and two archetypal organizational attributes: the man-
agerial corporation and the cluster of companies charac-
terized by interfirm knowledge spillovers.
From a theoretical perspective, we build a framework
in which we investigate how the intensity of managerial
corporate versus knowledge cluster characteristics influ-
ence the shape of the reward distribution of a region.
March (1991) notes that the variance and the mean of
a reward distribution change according to the under-
lying organizational learning mechanisms. We specify
March’s argument by studying the different learning
microdynamics of our two organizational attributes, and
show that they produce differences in the macrostruc-
ture of rewards at the regional level. We develop four
hypotheses: holding managerial corporate characteris-
tics constant, an increase in the intensity of knowl-
edge cluster characteristics produce (1) higher dispersion
(2) higher mean of regional rewards; holding the region’s
knowledge cluster characteristics constant, an increase in
the intensity of the region’s managerial corporate char-
acteristics produce (3) lower dispersion (4) higher mean
of regional rewards.
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We test these hypotheses by running city-based regres-
sions for a sample of 146 U.S. cities. We employ
as dependent variable the salaries paid to managers
who reside in the city. Along with controls, we
employ proxies for the intensity of managerial cor-
porate and knowledge cluster characteristics. We find
that higher managerial corporate characteristics produce
less-dispersed regional rewards. However, they do not
produce significant differences in the average level of
rewards. By contrast, higher-knowledge cluster charac-
teristics imply higher average and dispersion of rewards.
It is important to clarify from the outset of our analysis
that managerial corporate and knowledge cluster charac-
teristics are not necessarily substitute. The intensity of
the managerial corporate or knowledge cluster character-
istics of a region can move—independently—along con-
tinuous dimensions. Moreover, managerial corporate and
knowledge cluster characteristics are not industry spe-
cific. A typical example is the software industry, which
features managerial corporations like Microsoft or SAP,
along with knowledge clusters in Silicon Valley, Ireland,
Israel, India, or Brazil (e.g., Arora and Gambardella
2005). Thus, industry attributes explain only some of the
differences in the distribution of rewards, which is why
we also need to look at the organizational attributes of
the industry in different locations.
In terms of the originality of our contribution, this
paper bridges a gap between the established literature
on the managerial corporation and knowledge clusters
(Audretsch and Feldman 1996, Tallman et al. 2004).
Apart from studies like Chesbrough (2000) or Audretsch
and Thurik (2001), not much has been done to com-
pare the two. Even the most convincing studies in this
area (Saxenian 1994) rely on specific examples. Con-
versely, we provide a new approach that brings together
two streams of literature, and shows how regional reward
distributions can differ in both their first and second
moment, according to the intensity of the organizational
attributes of the firms located within the region.
This is noteworthy for two reasons. First, we expand
the organization theory about regional industrial agglom-
erations by analyzing the issue from a different per-
spective: from the organizational attributes. In so doing,
we also draw attention to an issue that the organiza-
tional literature has not investigated in a significant way:
differences in the dispersion of rewards, and not just
in the expected value. Second, this paper is not cen-
tered on the origins of industrial agglomeration (Chiles
et al. 2004) or on the type of resources that are devel-
oped or exchanged, but on outcomes at the regional eco-
nomic level. We offer a micro-based foundation centered
on a knowledge and organizational argument (Bell and
Zaheer 2007, March 1991) to explain some macro differ-
ences in regional rewards. We then highlight the role of
intra- and interfirm processes of knowledge creation and
circulation (Gittelman 2007, Tallman and Phene 2007)
as an important mechanism that explains differences in
the distribution of the regional rewards. Note that this
explanation does not directly resort to industry-based
factors.
Finally, we propose an important contribution at the
empirical level. To our knowledge, this is the first article
that shows how the measures of knowledge spillovers
drawn from patent citations (Jaffe et al. 1993) and from
high-skill labor mobility data (Kim and Marschke 2005)
produce consistent and similar results.
The next section presents our theory and hypotheses.
Section 3 discusses our sample and variables. Section 4
presents our empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Theory and Hypotheses
A taxonomy developed by Romanelli and Khessina
(2005) proposes two central organizational attributes
to classify regions from an economic point of view:
(1) dominance and (2) interrelatedness. They apply these
two dimensions to regional clusters. In their framework,
regions can exhibit industrial clusters that vary in their
size and in the intensity of their interconnections. We
go a step further and investigate these two attributes for
the firms that populate a region, not within the specific
realm of an industrial cluster.
To be precise, we analyze how managerial corpo-
ration versus knowledge cluster characteristics affect
the dispersion and the mean of regional reward dis-
tributions. Organizational attributes affect the learning
processes, the interactions among firms, and the knowl-
edge coordination that finally determines the shape of a
reward distribution (March 1991). The underpinning of
our analysis is that the mean and dispersion of rewards
change according to the high-low intensity of manage-
rial corporate or knowledge cluster characteristics. Thus,
in our framework they are two dimensions that change
along a continuum. This also means that in our setting
there are “baseline” regions characterized by firms that
are not organized in knowledge clusters—i.e., that do not
feature knowledge spillovers—and that exhibit scarce or
null managerial-corporate characteristics. As we move
along our two dimensions, there will be regions that
exhibit more of one of them, more of the other, or more
of both, in different combinations.1
2.1. Knowledge Cluster
The salient feature of the knowledge cluster is the pres-
ence of localized interfirm knowledge spillovers. Inter-
firm knowledge spillovers imply that these firms exploit
a common information pool—the classical view sug-
gested by Saxenian (1994). In Silicon Valley, conversely,
firms and individuals share common information aris-
ing from several factors like alliances, labor mobility,
and constant participation in meetings and professional
associations. Rivkin (2000) argues that interfirm knowl-
edge spillovers favor imitation among firms, producing
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potential similarities in the combination of firm strate-
gies and resources. Powell et al. (1996) show that inter-
firm knowledge spillovers produced by firms in tight
geographical boundaries are correlated with a signifi-
cant overlap of the firms’ final markets. This happens
because firms tend to specialize within an industry that
shares similar technologies and customers (Romanelli
and Khessina 2005). Similarly, on many occasions the
main competitors of incumbent firms are geographi-
cally bounded spin-offs that inherited competencies in
the form of knowledge spillovers (Klepper 2002). Thus,
the knowledge cluster dimension stems from the level
of interfirm knowledge spillover, firm spatial proximity,
common pool of knowledge, rate of imitation, and over-
lap in the final markets.
The standard perspective about the dispersion of the
returns of a set of activities is that the total dispersion
is a function of the variances of the individual activities
and their combined covariances.2 These activities could
be innovation projects or, more generally, operational
tasks (e.g., project design, prototyping, and definition
of manufacturing operations). In knowledge clusters, the
first-order effect is on the covariances. With no ex ante
coordination, the higher the region’s knowledge clus-
ter characteristics, the higher the probability that firms
enhance the pursuit of similar activities, increasing the
covariances between them, which increases the disper-
sion of the overall reward distribution.
The increasing dispersion of rewards is reinforced by
another consideration that has to do with the variance
of the activities. The question whether higher-knowledge
cluster characteristics increase or diminish the intensity
of rivalry (and so the variance of the individual activ-
ities) is still debated in the literature. Strategy scholars
from industrial economics (e.g., Caves and Porter 1977)
highlight that interfirm imitation and knowledge exter-
nalities facilitate tacit coordination and the control of
the market, thereby softening the rivalry among firms.
By contrast, the resource-based view (Barney 1991) and
population ecology (Barnett and Sorenson 2002) suggest
that high rates of interfirm mutual learning and imitation
increase the intensity of competition among firms. In a
related vein, hyper-competition theories (Ilinitch et al.
1996) stress how the threat of imitation triggers firms to
adopt a proactive behavior characterized by the need to
improve continually their competitive advantages, gener-
ating environments that exhibit features closer to winner-
takes-all and leader-dethroning models.
As far as our setting is concerned, higher-knowledge
cluster characteristics can produce greater congestion of
firms in similar markets, which answers the question of
how imitation affects rivalry. Gimeno and Woo (1996)
triangulate the level of firm rivalry with the degree of
overlap of firm markets. They conclude more-intense
interfirm knowledge spillovers create greater competi-
tion when the markets in which the firms compete are
similar. When firms share few similar markets, greater
levels of imitation and mutual learning boost compe-
tition (Alcácer and Chung 2007). In sum, the more
interfirm knowledge spillovers are spatially bounded, the
higher the knowledge cluster characteristics, the higher
the overlap in the final markets, and the higher the firm
rivalry. This implies that higher-knowledge cluster char-
acteristics tend to transform competition into a “right
tail” race where only few winners are rewarded hand-
somely and most of the participants are not rewarded.
This leads to a higher dispersion of rewards because the
mass of rewards falls onto the right tail of the reward
distribution, as opposed to being spread more homoge-
neously across all the participants in the race.
The right-tail nature of competition implies a stiffer
selection in the population of firms and of the under-
lying competencies. Therefore, differences in the indi-
vidual abilities that foster productivity gain matter to
a greater extent. As a result, when knowledge cluster
characteristics are high, the rewards are more likely to
reflect natural differences in the distribution of individual
skills, expertise, and capabilities. This is also the view
suggested by Frank and Cook (1995) who explain dis-
parity in rewards by the presence of “winner-takes-all”
markets.3 According to these authors, when organiza-
tional success depends almost exclusively on the indi-
vidual’s human capital contributions, the dispersion of
the rewards in a market increases, providing a clearer
link between the individuals’ rewards in a region and the
performance of the organizations that populate it. This
leads to our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Other things being equal, environ-
ments with higher-knowledge cluster characteristics are
associated with a higher dispersion in the reward
distribution.
Higher-knowledge cluster characteristics also have a
brighter side because firms can use knowledge created
by others. Moreover, the firms in knowledge clusters
focus on similar information pools and areas, which
makes the spillovers more effective due to specialization
economies. In high-knowledge cluster environments,
activities are not coordinated ex ante: they are only
selected ex post by the competitive selection mech-
anism. As a result, even if they are eventually out-
competed, these activities generate useful knowledge for
other firms.
Several authors advance the idea that higher-
knowledge cluster characteristics produce an effective
mechanism for raising the average performance of firms.
Among others, Porter (1998) highlights how firms that
are spatially close and share a common knowledge base
could achieve a competitive advantage as a cluster.
Inspired by Henderson and Clark’s (1990) distinc-
tion between component and architectural knowledge,
Tallman et al. (2004) suggest that higher-knowledge
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cluster characteristics regions create cluster architectural
knowledge that confers a competitive advantage to the
firms in the cluster. First, the competitive advantage gen-
erates architectural knowledge from the cluster because
it has a strong tacit component that is only available
to the firms in the cluster. In addition, the higher the
knowledge cluster characteristics, the higher the value of
the knowledge, given specialization economies, and the
more difficult it is to absorb for firms outside the cluster.
Similarly, Lampel and Shamsie (2003) coined the term
cluster capability to mean a pool of shared knowledge
resources to which the outsiders of a cluster cannot gain
access. According to the resource-based view (Barney
1991), this is a sufficient condition to create a competi-
tive advantage for the firms in the knowledge cluster.
Second, stronger levels of cluster architectural knowl-
edge make the diffusion of component knowledge easier
inside the knowledge cluster, generating an additional
competitive advantage. This second effect is linked
to the reduction of transaction costs. When knowl-
edge cluster characteristics increase, market mechanisms
are not necessary, and transaction costs are signifi-
cantly reduced due to the lack of formal exchanges
(Storper 1993).
In sum, the competitive advantage produced by mutual
interfirm learning seems to be a common explanation
of the superior performance of these knowledge clusters
(Audretsch and Feldman 1996) that produce sustainable
nonstandard rewards (Sorenson 2003). This leads to our
second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Other things being equal, environ-
ments with higher-knowledge cluster characteristics
are associated with a higher mean in the reward
distribution.
2.2. Managerial Corporation
According to the classical Chandlerian-Penrosian view,
the managerial corporation is characterized by a divi-
sion of the organization into subunits focused on specific
activities or operations, by a coordination of these sub-
units and their activities, by hierarchical decision mak-
ing, and by an ex ante assessment and selection of activ-
ities and projects. While the model has evolved since
Chandler or Penrose discussed it, these features remain
typical.
As discussed earlier, the overall dispersion of rewards
has two components: (i) the variance of the individual
activities and (ii) their covariances. We hypothesize that
higher managerial corporate characteristics produce (i) a
lower variance of the returns of each activity, and, for
given variances, (ii) a lower combined covariance.
In terms of the variance, the internal division of labor
of the managerial corporation hinges on individual spe-
cialized expertise performing particular tasks within a
set of coordinated activities designed ex ante (Faraj
and Sproull 2000). As a result, each human capability
is assigned to a particular operational process that is
blueprinted in advanced. An increase in the standardiza-
tion of the processes produces a higher homogenization
of expertise that reduces the variability of the final per-
formance. This is the classical effect of routines that
makes outcome less variable by creating standard and
repetitive assignments (Nelson and Winter 1982). There-
fore, the intensity of task standardization and the cor-
responding homogenization of expertise are responsible
for smoothing out individual differences in productivity,
and thus the dispersion of rewards.
In addition, there is an extensive literature linking
the level of ex ante coordination with the conserva-
tive behavior of a managerial corporation. This means
a “resting on one’s laurels” attitude (Christensen 1997),
a late-entry strategic choice (Mitchell 1991), path-
dependence in learning (Levinthal and March 1993),
or cognitive and mental model limitations (Burgelman
1994). Put simply, the higher the level of managerial
corporate characteristics, the higher the probability that
a firm will select those activities wherein it has bet-
ter experience and greater abilities to predict the final
outcomes.
The other effect comes through the covariance. The
coordination inherent in the managerial corporation
enables the adoption of a portfolio approach. Given dif-
ferent portfolios of activities with similar total expected
return, a coordinated structure tends to pick the port-
folios that exhibit low total variance through an appro-
priate ex ante combination of covariances. If the same
activities were conducted by independent organizations,
the lack of ex ante coordination would not produce an
equally rational choice of covariances. For example, an
independent unit will not necessarily reject the devel-
opment of an activity because there are other potential
independent units that will execute some positively cor-
related activities.
It is worth noting that greater hierarchical coordina-
tion produced by higher managerial corporate charac-
teristics can create increasing task dependencies among
activities that are, in principle, independent. Therefore,
the performance of an individual or unit increasingly
depends on the efforts and the performance of sev-
eral other individuals or units in other organizational
layers. Malone et al. (1999) classify the forms of depen-
dence that can be found in a managerial corporation in
flow, sharing, and fit. Flow occurs when one activity
requires that another activity is performed before or after
it; sharing arises when two activities need to use the
same resource; and fit happens when they have to match
each other by sharing some common protocols. All
three forms need coordination. Flow requires schedul-
ing so that the activities proceed in the right sequence.
Sharing requires that the firm avoid circumstances that
congest the resource when multiple units use it at the
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same time. Fit requires matching in terms of standards.
In this respect, as Malone and Crowston (1994) dis-
cuss, when task dependencies generate new correla-
tions among activities leading to a common outcome,
greater organizational coordination reduces uncertainty
by establishing a temporal sequence of the decisions.
Interestingly, this is the same principle developed in
game theory, where the multiplicity of Nash equilibria
can be reduced by making decisions sequential rather
than parallel. Sequential decision making rules out some
paths, which may in turn reduce the set of Nash equi-
libria, and therefore uncertainty. For example, sequen-
tial decision making enables the unit that starts a pro-
cess to pick one of the standard protocols available, to
which the subsequent units have to adapt.4 This argu-
ment also relates to the standardization of expertise.
Increasing division of labor and task dependence imply
that the individuals are assigned to activities that depend
on and correlate to other modules, and the performance
of the overall set of operations depends on how they are
entrenched with each other rather than on the particular
value of one expertise or activity. In sum, an increasing
level of managerial corporate characteristics in a region
will reduce the dispersion in the distribution of rewards.
Our third hypothesis then reads as follows.
Hypothesis 3. Other things being equal, environ-
ments with higher managerial-corporate characteris-
tics are associated with lower dispersion in the reward
distribution.
Some inherent characteristics of the managerial cor-
poration can produce efficiency advantages. The impact
can be on the benefit side or on the cost side. Effi-
ciency advantages usually translate into a higher mean
of the reward distribution (Porter 1998). On the benefit
side, increasing coordination and ex ante project selec-
tion enable the firm to curtail negative externalities and
enhance synergies, for example by avoiding cannibal-
ization across firm products. At the same time, increas-
ing knowledge coordination facilitates the exploitation
of synergies or economies of scope across business
activities (Zollo and Winter 2002). Indeed, when firms
intentionally manage ex ante internal knowledge, scope
economies arise and create long-term sustainable advan-
tages. Finally, greater coordination fosters higher spe-
cialization and increasing returns in the subunits, as
described by Schilling (2000) in the case of organiza-
tions that achieve superior quality performance, thanks
to the knowledge specialization of hierarchically coordi-
nated subunits.
On the cost side, higher managerial corporate char-
acteristics increase the harmonization of information
flows and favor knowledge reusability and the culling of
knowledge duplications. This is traditionally a nontrivial
source of cost savings (Garud and Kumaraswamy 1993).
In addition, coordination and the division of labor inside
the firm, as well as its system of authority, is a powerful
source of transaction-cost savings (Jacobides and Win-
ter 2005). Higher managerial corporate characteristics
can resolve problems associated with asset specificity or
asymmetric information quicker than administrative res-
olutions by independent third parties (e.g., courts), as in
the case of markets.
Another feature of the managerial corporation is that
it is more efficient in evaluating its activities. As Sah and
Stiglitz (1986) note, organizations can make two types
of errors: (1) they can support activities that are even-
tually unprofitable (Type-I error) or (2) they can reject
activities that are eventually profitable (Type-II error).
Sah and Stiglitz argue that, in hierarchical organizations,
activities are viable only if approved by all the sub-
units. In a theoretical model, they demonstrate that, other
things being equal, hierarchies approve both fewer good
and fewer bad projects, i.e., they reduce the probability
of Type-I errors and increase the probability of Type-II
errors. They then conclude that hierarchies increase or
decrease the mean of a reward distribution depending on
the underlying shape of the reward distribution. A man-
agerial corporation adds division of labor and knowledge
coordination to the standard hierarchy. This means that
each subunit checks the particular angle of the activity
in which it is specialized and therefore competent. As a
result, higher managerial corporate characteristics create
assessment capabilities that produce a lower probabil-
ity to reject a profitable activity (lower Type-II error)
and a lower probability to accept an unprofitable activity
(lower Type-I error), which is the source of its advan-
tage. This leads to our fourth hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4. Other things being equal, environ-
ments with higher managerial corporate characteris-
tics are associated with a higher mean of the reward
distribution.
3. Sample and Variables
3.1. Sample
Our empirical analysis employs data on 146 U.S. cities.
City-level data are the natural unit of observation to test
our hypotheses about the mean and the dispersion of
rewards. Basically, we want to compare these measures
across N units when they operate within one firm or in
N independent firms. The geographical area is a good
candidate for our purposes because there are costs to the
geographical mobility of people or units. Cities turn out
to be the smallest unit of analysis for which we could
find useful and extensive data to address our questions.
We therefore assume that there is no significant bias
in aggregating firm-level observations for the cities in
which they are located.
We select U.S. cities from the locations of the firm
headquarters that appear in the Fortune list of the 500
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largest U.S. companies and the INC list of 500 U.S.
fastest-growing private companies. The rationale for this
sampling criterion is to have cities with significant busi-
ness activities in which there are enough managerial cor-
porations or high growth small-medium firms. We use the
two lists only to identify the cities, and we do not utilize
the corresponding firm names. We register all the cities in
the two lists during three consecutive years: 1998, 1999,
and 2000. We then select the first 100 cities in each list
after ordering them by their number of firms. There are
249 cities in the Fortune list; the sample of the most
important 100 cities accounts for 86% of total sales of all
the listed Fortune firms in the three years. There are 486
cities in the INC list; the sample of the most important
100 cities accounts for 75% of total sales of all the listed
INC firms in the three years. Because a city could be in
both lists, we end up with a total sample of 146 cities. Our
sample includes 66% of all the U.S. cities with a popula-
tion over 150,000. Las Vegas (NV), Honolulu (HI), and
Long Beach (CA) are the largest three cities excluded
by our sampling criterion since they do not appear as
the top 100 cities either in the Fortune list or in the
INC list. The sample cities include all the largest U.S.
cities (New York, Atlanta, Los Angeles, etc.), along with
other smaller cities in which there is significant business
activity. For example, our sample distinguishes between
Boston and Framingham, a suburb of Boston, where the
large office superstore Staples operates.
There might be some concerns about the relation-
ship between cities and firm locations. The problem
is not relevant for the many companies that have
unique locations, and that exhibit the same legal and
operational location. In the case of large multiloca-
tion companies, the problem could be more serious.
To tackle this issue, we randomly check a sample
of large companies with the Mergent Industrial Man-
ual (http://www.mergent.com), which provides data on
plants, offices, and other facilities for more than 2,000
top industrial corporations. The address of the firm
headquarters corresponds to the presence of quite a
few establishments and offices in the city. In addition,
our sample includes the city of Wilmington, Delaware.
Delaware is a state where many firms maintain small
corporate headquarters for tax reasons. We check this
city and find that it does not exhibit a particularly large
number of firms relative to other cities in our sample.
It does not show an apparent bias in some of the other
covariates, such as patents. Specifically, in our sample
we have only 37 patents in Delaware in the period under
study, versus 887 in Boston, 95 in Framingham, 418 in
Baltimore, and 1,040 in Philadelphia. The complete list
of cities in our sample is available upon request.
3.2. Dependent Variables: Rewards of a Region
Table 1 lists all the variables used in our empirical
analysis.
Table 1 Definition of Variables
Variable Definition
Dependent variables
Salary Average annual salary for the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) occupational class
“Managerial Occupations” in the
metropolitan area (MA), 1998–2000
(in $). Source: BLS.
Salaryspread Interquartile range (difference between the
75th and 25th percentiles) of the salary
of the occupational class “Managerial
Occupations” in the MA, 1998–2000
(in $). Source: BLS.
Independent variables of theoretical interest
Patentspillover Share of citations of 1998–2000 patents to
other patents granted to unaffiliated
entities located in the same city over
total citations made by the 1998–2000
patents. Source: NBER Patent Database.
Mobilityspillover Share of scientists and engineers
employed in the city who changed
employer at least once in the previous
year (average 1998–2000). Same
variable as in Kim and Marschke (2005).
Source: U.S. Current Population Survey.
Patentcorporation Share of self-citations over total citations
made by the 1998–2000 patents.
Variable directly computed by the NBER
Patent Database. Source: NBER Patent
Database.
Sizecorporation Pearson coefficient of skewness (mean
minus median over standard deviation)
of the employment distribution of the
firms in the city, 1998–2000. Source:
Osiris Bureau Van Dijk.
Control variables
Firmsize Average number of employees of firms in
the city, 1998–2000. Source: Osiris
Bureau Van Dijk.
Sector Dummies Dummies = 1 for trademark sector with
largest number of trademarks in the
city. Source: U.S. Patents and Trademark
Office (USPTO).
Herfindahl Herfindahl index on the city trademarks
calculated over the 48 product
categories. Source: USPTO.
Patentgdp Number of patents over GDP (in million $)
of the MA, 1998–2000. Source: NBER
Patent Database, and
http://www.epodunk.com.
Education Share of population with a four-year
degree in 2000. Source:
http://www.epodunk.com.
Income Annual income per capita, 1998–2000.
Source: http://www.epodunk.com.
As a proxy of the rewards of a city we use the salary
of resident managers in the city. Managerial salaries
reflect the productivity of the managerial function; they
are linked to the performance of the organization. Man-
agement is a generalist occupation that can be found in
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any industry. Therefore, industry composition should not
bias this measure of performance. This is also a better
measure than standard accounting measures, especially
for comparing managerial companies and small-medium
firms. Financial databases usually underrepresent small-
medium firms, while our U.S. manager salary data, drawn
from the BLS, are derived from more than six million
individual observations. Salaries, of course, are affected
by local market conditions. However, this is functional
to our analysis, because the manager salary can be
thought of as the opportunity cost of an entrepreneur,
and hence can be a measure of the productivity of the
entrepreneurial function as well, which is an important
dimension of the knowledge cluster.
To be specific, for our sample cities, and for the period
1998–2000, we retrieve the wages of the class “man-
agement occupations” from the Occupational Employ-
ment Statistics (OES) of the U.S. BLS. This is a fairly
wide occupational class that includes many categories
of managerial jobs, from CEOs to marketing managers.
We assign to each city the 1998–2000 average wage
(Salary) of the U.S. MA where the city is located
according to the U.S. MA definition of the U.S. Bureau
of Census (http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/
metro-city/99mfips.txt). From the same source, we col-
lect data on the interquartile range of the managerial
salaries in the city (difference between the 75th and
25th percentiles). We use the 1998–2000 average of this
range as a measure of the variability of the manage-
rial salary (Salaryspread). Among other things, this
limits the potential effect of any dot.com fever bias.
The dot.com “bubble” occurred during approximately 10
months between June 1999 and March 2000. Thus, we
employ a three-year average, with one year before and
one year after the bubble.
The BLS definition of wages includes all the ele-
ments of the full compensation of the employee foreseen
explicitly by the job contract. It then includes individ-
ual bonuses mentioned in the contract, but not some
collective bonuses offered by the employer on a non-
individual basis to all or specific groups of employees
(http://www.bls.gov/dolfaq/bls_ques20.htm). Moreover,
it includes the stock options explicitly mentioned in the
initial job contract, but not those offered outside it.5
3.3. Variables of Theoretical Interests
3.3.1. Proxies for Knowledge Cluster Characteristics.
Knowledge clusters are characterized by geographically
bounded interfirm knowledge spillovers. The empiri-
cal literature has measured knowledge spillovers in two
ways: (i) patent citations (Jaffe et al. 1993) or (ii) the
labor mobility of scientists and engineers (Almeida and
Kogut 1999, Kim and Marschke 2005). For robustness
reasons, we employ both measures.
We first download all the USPTO patents granted in
1998–2000 in which the address of the assignee is in one
of the cities in our sample. We are aware that the patents
of the large multilocation companies may report the
address of the headquarters or legal offices even if the
research is carried out elsewhere. To tackle this overrep-
resentation problem, we attribute a patent to a city only
if at least one of the inventors’ addresses is in the same
city of the assignee. This means that if a patent assignee
is a firm headquartered in Chicago but no one of the
inventors’ cities is in Chicago, we do not assign this
patent to Chicago. With this criterion, the selected sam-
ple covers 67.1% of the entire patent sample. We then
match these patents with the NBER U.S. Patent Citation
data set (http://www.nber.org). We use the citations made
by our sample patents to construct a measure of interfirm
knowledge spillovers across firms. This is the ratio (a/b)
between (a) the citations made by the patents of firms in
the city to other patents by unaffiliated assignees whose
address is in the same city, and (b) the total citations of
the patents of firms in the city (with the same conserva-
tive rule that at least one inventor’s address is in the MA
of the city). This is a measure of how much city patents
rely on patents granted to other organizations in the same
city. This variable, which we label Patentspillover,
is a natural proxy for the importance of current local
interfirm knowledge spillovers. To obtain the numera-
tor of Patentspillover, we first exclude the citations
to firms located outside the assignee’s city. Then, from
this subsample of patent citations, we exclude the self-
citations (i.e., assignee’s citations to its own patents).
Because patent-based measures could be biased (i.e.,
many industries do not rely on patents to protect inno-
vations; citations are often assigned by patent examin-
ers and not firms), we construct an alternative proxy
based on the labor mobility of scientists and engineers.
As Saxenian (1994) puts it, people perceive that they
are employed “by the Valley” rather than by the indi-
vidual firms. We adopt the measure employed by Kim
and Marschke (2005), since Almeida and Kogut (1999)
still use a patent-based proxy of scientist mobility. Thus,
from the U.S. Current Population Survey (http://www.
census.gov/cps), for the years 1998–2000, and for each
city, we calculate the average turnover experience (i.e.,
the share of mobile scientists) of all scientists and engi-
neers, based on whether they change employers in the
year before the survey and whether they remain in the
same city. We use the same eight occupation categories
for scientists and engineers used by Kim and Marschke
(2005). We label this variable Mobilityspillover.
3.3.2. Proxies for Managerial Corporate Charac-
teristics. As in the case of knowledge spillovers, we
employ for robustness reasons both a patent-based and
a nonpatent-based measure to account for the presence
of managerial corporations. First, we rely on the fact
that in these firms a good deal of the knowledge base
and competencies are formed internally. Our theory pre-
dicts that the effects on regional rewards are brought
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about by the ability to manage and select internal infor-
mation. To confirm this point, Mowery (1983) observes
that the increase in internal R&D raised the importance
of intrafirm specific resources of knowledge, especially
for large firms. Like in the case of knowledge clus-
ters, we construct a measure of the exchange of internal
knowledge from patent data. Thus, our first measure of
the importance of managerial corporations is the ratio
between the total number of self-citations (i.e., citations
to the same assignee) and the total citations made by
the patents in the cities. We label this variable Patent-
corporation. A larger value of Patentcorporation
denotes that a larger share of the knowledge produced in
the city depends on previous knowledge produced within
the same organization, as the presence of our archetypal
representation of the managerial corporation implies.
We also use a more direct proxy for the presence
of managerial corporations, which exploits the fact that
these firms tend to be large. For this purpose, from the
database Icarus of Bureau Van Dijk, we select all the
firms in our sample cities for the period 1998–2000.
This produces 10,662 firm-year observations. We then
calculate the Pearson coefficient of skewness of the size
distribution (measured by the number of employees) of
the firms in the city. This is the difference between the
mean and the median of the distribution normalized by
its standard deviation, and it is an indicator of the skew-
ness of the distribution that does not depend critically
on the shape of the distribution itself. A larger value of
this variable, which we name Sizecorporation, indi-
cates the presence of some very large firms in the city
compared to the median firm.
3.4. Variables of Control
We collect control data for each city from several
sources. In all the regressions, we use average firm size
(Firmsize), sector dummies, city sector specialization
(Herfindahl), the ratio between the number of patents
and the GDP of the city (Patentgdp), the share of pop-
ulation with a four-year academic degree (Education),
and income per capita (Income).
Apart from controlling for the average firm size in the
city, Firmsize ensures that Sizecorporation captures
the skewness of the firm size distribution (i.e., the pres-
ence of very large firms) rather than average firm size
itself. From the database Icarus of Bureau Van Dijk, we
use the average size in terms of employees of all the
firms located in the city in the sample period.
Sector dummies control for interindustry differences,
and aim at capturing a potential fixed effect of groups
of cities, which share the same main business activity.
The dummies denote the industry with the largest num-
ber of trademarks in the cities among the 48 USPTO
trademark product and service categories (NICE clas-
sification). Each industry dummy takes the value 1 for
all the cities in which the industry is the one with
the highest number of trademarks (e.g., all the cities
in which “computers” is the industry with the largest
number of trademarks). We end up with 14 sector dum-
mies. For all sample cities, the most important indus-
try accounts (on average) for 32.5% of the entire city
trademarks, with a standard deviation of 12.6%. Trade-
marks are combinations of “words, phrases, symbols, or
designs that identify and distinguish the source of the
goods (or services)” (USPTO Documentation, http://tess.
uspto.gov). We download all the trademarks whose
owner’s address corresponded to one of our sample cities
for the sample period.
To obtain a finer assessment of how many diverse
manufacturing activities are present in a city, we use
the same trademark source to compute for each city
the Herfindahl concentration index among the shares of
all the city trademarks over the 48 product categories
(Herfindahl).
The variable Patentgdp—i.e., the ratio between the
number of patents and the GDP of the city—controls for
whether the city hosts technologically intensive indus-
tries. This is also a way to control for the effect of
our patent-citation covariates on the reward measures,
because cities with lower patent-intensity could exhibit a
lower citation-intensity as well. Education is the share
of population with a four-year academic degree; it con-
trols for the effect of the supply of skills that could influ-
ence both the labor market and knowledge spillovers.
The income per capita, Income, is a measure of the
city’s wealth and of potential demand factors. We prefer
income per capita compared to the housing costs in the
city, because there is consolidated empirical literature
that treats housing costs as endogenous to income and
labor mobility, one of our core covariates (e.g., Bardhan
et al. 2003). However, when we use housing costs in lieu
of income, our empirical results are largely the same. All
three controls above are important to prevent our core
independent variables from capturing effects due to the
technological intensity, education level, or wealth of the
city. These data are from http://www.epodunk.com.
Table 2 provides basic descriptive statistics of the vari-
ables used. Table 3 shows the correlation matrix.
4. Empirical Analysis
We test our hypotheses by running robust OLS regres-
sions. Table 4 shows our results by using the two
salary-based dependent variables. The baseline model of
each set (0) omits the main covariates, showing only
the results with the control variables. The other four
models of the set (Models I–VIII) use, alternatively,
the two proxies for the localized knowledge spillovers
(Patentspillover andMobilityspillover) and for the
presence of managerial corporations (Patentcorpora-
tion and Sizecorporation), while controls are always
included. We use a log-log specification. Because some
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Salary 75,473 9,431 53,243 101,114
Salaryspread 54,227 8,280 38,720 74,850
Patentspillover 0091 0088 0 0414
Mobilityspillover 0150 0018 0109 0209
Patentcorporation 0063 0063 0 0304
Sizecorporation 0347 0150 0124 0906
Firmsize 21864 6150 11136 67956
Herfindahl 0134 0093 0023 0539
Patentgdp 0085 0178 0001 1261
Education 0239 0070 0084 0377
Income 28,190 10,985 12,438 76,668
Sector Dummies
Chemicals (dropped) 0014 0116 0 1
Cosmetics and cleaning 0021 0142 0 1
preparations
Pharmaceuticals 0021 0142 0 1
Electrical and scientific 0582 0494 0 1
apparatus
Paper goods and 0048 0214 0 1
printed matters
Clothing 0048 0214 0 1
Toys and sporting goods 0021 0142 0 1
Staple foods 0034 0182 0 1
Advertising and business 0034 0182 0 1
Insurance and financial 0041 0199 0 1
Computer, scientific, 0137 0345 0 1
and legal
variables could take values equal to 0, we use the log of
1 plus the variable.
BothMobilityspillover and Patentspillover have
a positive and significant impact on all our two depen-
dent variables, viz. Salaryspread and Salary. This
provides a strong corroboration of Hypotheses 1 and 2.
The two covariates Patentcorporation and Sizecor-
poration have a significant impact on Salaryspread,
but they are not significant on Salary. Hypothesis 3 is
supported by the data, whereas Hypothesis 4 is not.
Our results about knowledge clusters are the most
important and robust findings of this paper. Knowledge
clusters induce a premium and a wider dispersion of
Table 3 Correlation Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Salary 1000
2. Salaryspread 0679 1000
3. Patentspillover 0377 0367 1000
4. Mobilityspillover 0372 0387 0990 1000
5. Patentcorporation 0136 −0023 0433 0424 1000
6. Sizecorporation 0106 0037 0423 0417 0879 1000
7. Firmsize −0081 0053 0020 0039 −0018 −0038 1000
8. Herfindahl 0355 0384 0280 0293 −0034 0037 0118 1000
9. Patentgdp 0409 0410 0355 0366 0190 0306 0082 0363 1000
10. Education 0194 0230 0121 0131 −0095 −0011 0025 0246 0333 1000
11. Income 0333 0346 0135 0130 −0088 −0039 −0003 0247 0392 0749 1000
the rewards. Greater expected rewards in these systems
are associated with a greater variability of rewards.
Moreover, by using the results in Table 4, we find
that, when all the other covariates are held at their
mean value, a 20% increase from the mean of either
Mobilityspillover or Patentspillover produces an
increase in Salaryspread ranging between 3.7% and
3.9% across our four models. This produces an increase
in the difference between the 25th and 75th percentiles
of the wage distribution of about $2,000–$2,114. The
same experiment for Salary produces a growth in the
dependent variable ranging between 2.6% and 2.8% (i.e.,
$ 1,962–$2,113). The concomitant increase in mean and
spread is in line with theories that predict that high rates
of interfirm spillovers and imitation increase both per-
formance and the intensity of competition among firms.
In other words, knowledge clusters increase the produc-
tivity of a region, but they also create hypercompetitive
environments, which in turn produce a higher spread of
returns.
The similarity of the impacts of Patentspillover
and Mobilityspillover is interesting per se. Thomp-
son (2006) shows that patent citations do not gen-
erally measure knowledge flows, apart from the case
in which patent citations are local and occur in
highly entrepreneurial and innovation-oriented regions.
Almeida and Kogut (1999) find that in these regions
patent citations are correlated with labor mobility. Thus,
as Alcácer and Gittelman (2006, p. 777) conclude, “The
mobility of engineers has shown to be a primary mecha-
nism for generating knowledge flows and, by extension,
citations across firms.” This confirms that local patent
citations and the mobility of scientists and engineers
are two good proxies for identifying knowledge clusters
characterized by local knowledge flows and interfirm
knowledge spillovers.
As noted, Hypothesis 3 finds a robust confirmation
in our data. Our proxies for managerial corporations
(Patentcorporation and Sizecorporation) show a
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Table 4 Robust OLS Regressions
Dependent variables
Salaryspread Salary
Models 0.a I II III IV 0.b V VI VII VIII
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2
Patentspillover 051∗∗ 047∗∗ 031∗∗ 037∗∗
0186 0187 0134 0138
Mobilityspillover 054∗∗ 050∗∗ 030∗∗ 036∗∗
0175 0175 0130 0127
Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4
Patentcorporation −038∗∗ −039∗∗ 0084 0092
0170 0174 0184 0185
Sizecorporation −0044∗ −0045∗ −0015 −0013
0016 0025 0024 0024
Controls
Firmsize 0012 0003 0008 0002 0002 −0054 −0056 −0057 −0059 −0061
0047 0048 0040 0049 0048 0038 0039 0039 0039 0039
Herfindahl 005∗∗ 004∗∗ 004∗∗ 004∗∗ 004∗∗ 004∗∗ 003∗∗ 003∗∗ 003∗∗ 003∗∗
0015 0016 0016 0016 0016 0012 0012 0012 0012 0012
Patentgdp 001∗∗ 0014∗ 0014∗ 0015∗ 001∗∗ 001∗∗ 001∗∗ 001∗∗ 001∗∗ 001∗∗
0008 0008 0008 0008 0008 0007 0007 0007 0007 0007
Education −0091 −0095 −0097 −0092 −0093 −0073 −0076 −0076 −0075 −0076
0059 0058 0059 0058 0058 0053 0052 0052 0052 0053
Income 013∗∗ 012∗∗ 012∗∗ 012∗∗ 012∗∗ 011∗∗ 011∗∗ 012∗∗ 011∗∗ 011∗∗
0050 0052 0052 0052 0052 0047 0047 0047 0047 0047
Sector Dummies Yes
Constant 998∗∗ 994∗∗ 993∗∗ 988∗∗ 986∗∗ 107∗∗ 105∗∗ 105∗∗ 105∗∗ 105∗∗
0433 0469 0462 0462 0453 0437 0425 0425 0432 0433
Adjusted R2 0243 0287 0294 0281 0287 0233 0260 0258 0261 0259
Notes. Number of observations 146. p-values based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses. ∗p-values≤ 010; ∗∗p-
values≤ 005. All variables are in logs. Variables whose min was equal to 0 were set as log of 1 plus the variable.
negative and significant impact on Salaryspread. This
brings empirical support to the view that the structured
ex ante control of the internal knowledge of the manage-
rial corporation—involving intrafirm coordination and
an effective management of internal information flows—
“insures” the environment in which these firms are
placed. With all the other covariates at their mean value,
a 20% increase from the mean of Patentcorporation
and Sizecorporation produces an average decrease in
Salaryspread in the models of about 3% and 0.5%,
respectively.
By contrast, Hypothesis 4 is not confirmed. Our prox-
ies for the presence of managerial corporations do not
produce any significant effect on the mean of regional
rewards. It is well known that managerial corporations
can also generate bureaucracy costs because they create
procedures (for coordination, information flows, project
selection, or other operations), or because of the lack
of high-powered individual incentives, which is typi-
cal of bureaucratic environments. In addition, there are
costs associated with the fact that in these organiza-
tions some managers are dedicated to coordination and
the resolution of potential conflicts, and therefore can-
not be allocated to directly productive activities such
as innovation, or the development and launch of new
projects and products. In addition, the managerial firm
may no longer have an absolute advantage in assessing
projects, at least across all sectors. Additionally, exter-
nal mechanisms, like venture capital or other financial
intermediaries, may produce similar project assessment
capabilities in decentralized decision-making systems.
Our empirical result may then suggest that the classical
benefits of the managerial firm in terms of coordination,
information flows, and project selection could probably
be mediated by other variables like type of knowledge,
sector, and financial structure of the production process.
This result is consistent with the literature on the rela-
tionships between firm size and profitability. A classical
contribution is McGahan and Porter (1999), who find
that firm size does not affect profitability after control-
ling for the industry from which the firm originates.
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As far as the other covariates are concerned, Patent-
gdp and Income tend to be largely significant among
the different regressions with a positive sign. This means
that richer and more innovation-intensive regions are
biased toward a model with higher rewards and higher
risks. Herfindahl has a positive and significant sign;
it suggests that if a region is concentrated in few
industrial activities, then it will produce higher rewards
and higher dispersion. This evidence is consistent with
our Hypotheses 1 and 2, whereby when there are few
and similar markets, knowledge spillovers can generate
winner-takes-all models. Firmsize and Education do
not produce significant results. Their effects could be
shadowed by the other covariates, e.g., Patentgdp for
education and sector dummies for Firmsize.
We perform several robustness checks of our results.
In particular, we experiment with other specifications of
the regressions that we obtain after dropping some of
the controls or by using other controls drawn from our
data sources—e.g., the unemployment rate of the cities,
the population, the average city housing costs, the share
of PhDs in the population, the number of firms with
more than 1,500, 7,000, or 15,000 employees, or the
coefficient of skewness. Because many economic activi-
ties involve services, we modify our mobility measure to
include financial and consultancy occupations in order to
test any potential service-sector bias in our analysis. We
also take into account the fact that some of our cities are
part of the same Consolidated Metropolitan State Area
(CMSA). We run our regressions after introducing two
dummies equal to 1 if the city was part of a CMSA
that includes three to five or more than five cities in
our sample. We find that this categorization marks a dis-
tinction between large, medium, and small MAs in the
United States. These dummies take into account that for
cities in larger CMSAs, there may be factors affecting
the dependent variable other than the other covariates in
the regressions. As an alternative specification, we intro-
duce the log of the number of cities in the same CMSA
in the sample as another covariate. All our results, and
particularly the impacts of our variables of theoretical
interest, are robust to these alternative specifications.
A panel data regression also confirms the results, even
if this exercise does not provide any new information,
given the scarce time variation of data. We also calcu-
late Salaryspread as the difference between the 10th
and 90th Percentile; again, the results are consistent. For
brevity, not all these robustness checks are shown. They
are available on request.
5. Conclusions
This article expands the organization theory of regional
industrial agglomerations (Chiles et al. 2004, Romanelli
and Khessina 2005) by discussing the economic effects
of different organizational attributes at a regional level.
Our evidence suggests that higher managerial-corporate
characteristics produce a lower dispersion of regional
rewards, while it has no effect on the expected reward
mean of the distribution. Higher-knowledge cluster char-
acteristics produce both higher dispersion and higher
expected regional rewards. We explain these results with
some fundamental differences in the organizational pro-
cesses that manage knowledge in these systems (March
1991) and in the related features of their competitive
environment.
Our work provides two main contributions. The first is
that, although there is a wide literature on the manage-
rial corporation and knowledge clusters, not much has
been done to compare the two. We offer one of the first
attempts to make this comparison on a systematic basis,
from both theoretical and empirical points of view. From
an empirical perspective, there is practically no evidence
on this matter based on systematic econometric analy-
ses. A notable feature of our analysis is therefore that it
hinges on the construction of a detailed and rich data set
built from different data sources that have been selected
to pick variables specifically suited for our purposes.
Our second contribution stems from the fact that this
research trajectory is vital for organization and busi-
ness studies, because it helps understand an important
process in business operations today. As an illustration,
in the current literature, there is a great discussion of
regional dimensions. We may then have contributed to
a better understanding of the links between organiza-
tional attributes and regions, and, more generally, we
may have encouraged others to think about organiza-
tional attributes and regions in a more integrated fashion.
From the theoretical point of view, our analysis makes
investors, managers, and policy makers better aware of
the implications of these two modes of organizing firms
and industries. This means, for instance, that similar pol-
icy interventions (e.g., on education, R&D, labor market)
could produce different outcomes, in terms of expected
returns and dispersion, in the two settings. Our analy-
sis is also consistent with the view that, for investors
and private and public venture capitalists, knowledge
clusters can generate “gambling-like” situations where
a good deal of investment is directed at failing ven-
tures, given the skewed distribution of rewards. As a
result, in this environment, where the probability of
picking the right investment is lower, the value of
cluster information is higher. This may be the reason
why most of the venture capital firms, which in the
1970s were financing Silicon Valley ventures from their
New York bases, progressively moved or opened sub-
sidiaries in the cluster, or why many venture capital
companies were even founded by former Silicon Val-
ley entrepreneurs. Conversely, investments in manage-
rial firms should be intended as insurance benchmarks.
Our results also suggest that one can construct bal-
anced investment portfolios on a regional basis, mixing
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investments in regions characterized by different organi-
zational attributes, instead of the classical industrial or
capitalization composition of the portfolio.
Our paper has limitations. The very fact that we
deal with new issues—and particularly the comparison
between our two organizational attributes—makes our
analysis difficult to execute. Compared to more nav-
igated topics, we cannot rely on a good background
of previous research. Moreover, new theoretical insights
produce new concepts that cannot benefit from read-
ily available data, for example from standard secondary
sources. Thus, in spite of the richness and specificity
of our data set, for some of our variables the data are
not as granular as we would prefer. In particular, man-
ager salaries could underestimate the long-term part of
rewards. As a robustness check, we also run the same
regressions with a dividend measure as a dependent vari-
able, because dividends could capture a fickle part of
the reward distribution that is especially important in
case of a widespread adoption of stock-related incentives
(Spagnolo 2000). Results are in line with the ones shown
in this article. We prefer not to publish them, however,
because dividends as they appear in the economic state-
ments are not a perfect proxy of localized rewards, since
they could be paid to stockholders throughout the world.
In addition, our treatment of the service sector is limited
to the robustness check obtained from including finan-
cial and consultancy occupations in our mobility mea-
sure. Although this addresses the problem in part, there
is ample room for obtaining better measures. Finally, our
classification criterion for the firm location has inevitable
limitations, despite our robustness checks, because it is
based on the location of the headquarters.
At the same time, we are comforted by the fact that, in
our empirical analysis, we find significant correlations,
which suggest that links among our variables exist, and
these correlations go largely in the directions suggested
by our theory. Moreover, our study is one of the first
to employ both a patent-based and a nonpatent-based
measure as a proxy for knowledge clusters, and we find
that they produce similar results.
Finally, we expect that not only can future research in
this area—especially with primary data sources—perfect
our theoretical concepts, but it can also employ new
measures, showing which variables measure what, and
rejecting some measures in favor of others that may
be more adequate. For example, it would be interest-
ing to demonstrate how knowledge spillovers intertwine
with higher competition for managerial labor in creat-
ing higher mean rewards in knowledge clusters. Unfor-
tunately, the lack of granularity of our data prevents us
from disentangling effects as specific as this one. We
hope that our analysis promotes new attempts to improve
upon these issues.
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Endnotes
1As an alternative to our continuum for managerial corporate
and knowledge cluster characteristics, we could think of a two
times two matrix with low or high intensity of managerial
corporate or knowledge cluster characteristics. Our baseline
regions would be in the low-low quadrant, and the positions
arising when one or the other dimensions, or both, increase
are straightforward. The key elements of our discussion in this
theory section would not change.
2Suppose that each activity generates some performance that
can be quantified as xi, where i= 12    m. Each return xi
has an expected value i and a standard deviation i. If the
total return from all the activities is a linear combination of
the single activities, viz. X =∑mi=1
ixi, where the weights

i ∈ 01 sum up to 1, then the variance of X, i.e., VarX,
is the weighted sum of the individual variances plus two times
the cross-covariances multiplied by the corresponding weights,
i.e., VarX=∑mi=1
i2i + 2
∑m
i=1
∑
j =i 
i
jCovxi xj.
3A winner-takes-all environment may imply a negative ex post
covariance in the expression for VarX (see Endnote 2). First,
however, the corresponding increase in the variance of the
xi may offset this negative effect. In addition, the common
shock that we hypothesized in the knowledge clusters (the ex
ante covariance, p. 3) may counterbalance this winner-takes-all
effect.
4A simple way of thinking about how coordination reduces
uncertainty in this case is to consider two units that produce
two resources that have to fit by using the same standard. Sup-
pose there are two standards, A and B. Independent decision
makers in the market would not know if the other uses A or B,
and this adds uncertainty because, given the standard chosen
by either of the two units, there is only a 50% chance that the
other will match. In the managerial firm, a higher-level man-
ager would define ex ante the standard to be followed, which
removes the uncertainty about the standard that the other units
will adopt. Equal examples could be made for “flows” (when
two events need to start in a given sequence, and the units have
to coordinate on when to start) or “sharing” (when two units
have to use the same resource and they have to coordinate on
when to use it).
5Thus, we acknowledge that manager salaries could under-
represent the long-term components of manager compensation
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like bonuses, share awards, health care, and retirement bene-
fits. In short, the salary-based measures may not include part
of the long-term payment, especially when manager salaries
are linked to ad hoc share option compensations.
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